There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static ...
Read More
There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
Read Less
Add this copy of Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics to cart. $51.65, new condition, Sold by Ingram Customer Returns Center rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from NV, USA, published 2010 by Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K.
Edition:
2010, Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Add this copy of Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics to cart. $58.17, new condition, Sold by GreatBookPrices rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Columbia, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2010 by Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K.
Edition:
2010, Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Publisher:
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Published:
2010
Language:
English
Alibris ID:
17987808681
Shipping Options:
Standard Shipping: $4.99
Choose your shipping method in Checkout. Costs may vary based on destination.
Seller's Description:
New. IX, 330 p. Intended for professional and scholarly audience. In Stock. 100% Money Back Guarantee. Brand New, Perfect Condition, allow 4-14 business days for standard shipping. To Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. protectorate, P.O. box, and APO/FPO addresses allow 4-28 business days for Standard shipping. No expedited shipping. All orders placed with expedited shipping will be cancelled. Over 3, 000, 000 happy customers.
Add this copy of Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics to cart. $85.86, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2010 by Springer.
Edition:
2010, Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K