At the Battle of Jutland eighty years ago in May 1916, 250 warships of the two most powerful fleets in the world clashed in an encounter which might potentially have reshaped forever the political map of Europe and the world beyond. In the event, though one in ten of the ships went to the bottom, and 9,000 men died, its consequences were less spectacular. The British Grand Fleet, which lost more ships and many more men than did its German opponent, had already enjoyed most of the strategic advantages of a victorious fleet ...
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At the Battle of Jutland eighty years ago in May 1916, 250 warships of the two most powerful fleets in the world clashed in an encounter which might potentially have reshaped forever the political map of Europe and the world beyond. In the event, though one in ten of the ships went to the bottom, and 9,000 men died, its consequences were less spectacular. The British Grand Fleet, which lost more ships and many more men than did its German opponent, had already enjoyed most of the strategic advantages of a victorious fleet before the action, and continued to do so afterwards in, if anything, even greater measure. However, the battle became an enduring source of controversy not so much over the outcome but rather over the handling of the much superior British fleet. There had clearly been important failures of communication and command. This book explores those failures, revealing their origin in conflicting styles of command and different understandings of the rules of the game. In fact it digs far deeper than the events of 31st May 1916, and traces the conflict of style back into the heady days of the Victorian Empire, when the Royal Navy was assimilating the advent of mechanization, and forming its future combat doctrine in the artificial conditions of peacetime. Andrew Gordon shows how the gallant admirals of the First World War were taught their trade, and how the doctrinal rifts exposed by Jutland were by no means new. But the significance of his book is far wider than that. By showing how far the Victorian suffocation of Nelsonic values was caused by doctrines and attitudes that tend to arise in times of peace, he identifies issues that may hold eternal relevance to the fightingservices.
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Add this copy of The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval to cart. $37.41, good condition, Sold by ThriftBooks-Atlanta rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Brownstown, MI, UNITED STATES, published 1997 by US Naval Institute Press.
Add this copy of The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval to cart. $76.54, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 1997 by Naval Institute Press.
Add this copy of The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval to cart. $85.00, very good condition, Sold by Sequitur Books rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Boonsboro, MD, UNITED STATES, published 1997 by Naval Institute Press.
This book does two things extremely well. The first and last quarter offer a superb analysis of the Battle of Jutland. Using the "signals manual" as its Rosetta stone the middle half gives an amazing accounting of how Victorian and Edwardian society impacted the culture of the Royal Navy between Nelson and WW1. This is history writing of the highest order. Unforgettable stuff. You'll never look at the Battle of Jutland the same after reading it.
CloseReading
Jul 23, 2007
England has a sinking feeling
Andrew Gordon's book The Rules of the Game is a difficult book to read and a difficult book to recommend and a difficult book to dismiss. Gordon's book is not difficult to read because it is poorly written. To the contrary, the author's style is very graceful, sometimes funny and always logical. The hurdle most readers will have to get over is the book's subject matter. The Rules of the Game is a book about the Naval Battle of Jutland-the clash between the United Kingdom's Grand Fleet and Germany's High Seas Fleet on May 31-June 1, 1916. The outcome was nothing like either side anticipated and, although both claimed victory, neither accomplished what they wanted. Andrew Gordon takes his readers through a lot of very technical detail. Some of the material went way over this reader's land-lubbing head. But the author is adept at providing context that caries the narrative along. More important, and more enjoyable to read, Gordon plumbs the depths of the Royal Navy's character during the Edwardian period. His book is not just a well crafted combat narrative. It is also an in-depth look at the creation and evolution of a military culture and the effect of custom and technology. Without a doubt it should be required reading for anyone who plans or has a career in the armed forces. The lessons about the differences in a peace time and war time military are very important. In fact anyone interested on the effect of technology on culture will find this book of great interest. And anyone interested in what makes people tick will find a wealth of material for thought. Gordon is good at keeping himself honest. He tells the reader when and why he is making suppositions or assumptions and explains where his ideas lead and why they could be wrong. And he respects his subject. He avoids-or at least acknowledges-judging by hind-site and has sympathy and understanding for the sailors at Jutland. After the battle began a war of reputations. The naval tactics and the combat assumptions used at Jutland by the two British commanders were out of synch and often at odds. A bitter brawl broke out inside the Royal Navy between men personally loyal to Admiral David Beatty and those who agreed with Admiral John Jellicoe. Gordon's book sifts through the controversies with intelligence. And he makes a good case that the officers involved-easily portrayed as Gilbert and Sullivan comic operetta sailors-where something else entirely. They were not fools, Gordon asserts. But they may have been made fools of.