Add this copy of The British Army & the Theory of Armored Warfare 1918 to cart. $58.81, good condition, Sold by Devils In The Detail Ltd rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Oxford, OXFORDSHIRE, UNITED KINGDOM, published 1984 by University of Delaware Press.
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Good. Picture Shown is For Illustration Purposes Only, Please See Below For Further DetailsCONDITION-GOOD Some foxing/grub/wear/tears/marks to jacket, foxing/spotting/grub to fore edges, pages in good condition, shipped from the UK. 272 p.
Add this copy of The British Army and the History of Armoured Warfare, to cart. $63.26, good condition, Sold by Robin Summers Books rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Aldeburgh, SUFFOLK, UNITED KINGDOM, published 1984 by University of Delaware Press.
Add this copy of The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, to cart. $75.00, good condition, Sold by Collins Books rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Seattle, WA, UNITED STATES, published 1984 by U. of Delaware.
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Good in Good+ jacket. 265pp, octavo, hc wjacket in mylar, tight binding, clean throughout, two 1" spots of soiling to the front and back cover, bow to the right edge of front cover, jacket is complete with a soiled back cover and light toning.
Add this copy of The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, to cart. $93.78, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 1984 by UNKNO.
Add this copy of The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, to cart. $98.00, very good condition, Sold by Lavendier Books rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Foster, RI, UNITED STATES, published 1984 by Univ of Delaware Pr.
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Very Good. Univ of Delaware Press; Newark, 1984. Hardcover. First edition. Near Fine, light wear to edges and corners, in a Very Good, rubbing, light soiling from handling/wear, Dustwrapper. A nice, clean unmarked copy. 8vo[octavo or aprx 6 x 9 inches], index, 265pp. We pack securely and ship daily with delivery confirmation on every book. The picture on the listing page is of the actual book for sale. Additional Scan(s) are available for any item, please inquire.
Add this copy of The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, to cart. $124.50, very good condition, Sold by DBookmahn's Used & Rare Books rated 1.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Burke, VA, UNITED STATES, published 1984 by Univ of Delaware Pr.
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Near Fine in Very Good+ jacket. 8vo-over 7¾"-9¾" Tall. 265pp. An analyis of the evolution of British thinking on armoured warfare between the wars and the failings which left Britain unprepared to cope with the Blitzkreig. Clean no marks.
Add this copy of The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, to cart. $325.00, very good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 1984 by Associated University Presses.
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Very good in Very good jacket. 265, [7] pages. Includes Notes. Charts, Acknowledgments, Bibliography and Index. Chapters are: Years of Defeat: The Search for Responsibility; The Tradition: The Strategy of Attrition; The Challenge: The Theory of Armored Warfare; The Postwar Period: 1918-1927; The Years of Experiment: 1927-34; The Period of Early Rearmament: 1934-37; Prelude to War: 1937-40; and Epilogue: The Test of Battle. Robert H. Larson received his Ph.D. in History from the University of Virginia. He has been with the Lycoming College Since 1969 and is now a Professor emeritus. This work includes substantial discussion of the works and influence of J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart as well as a substantive discussion of the Royal Tank Corps. The British Army invented the tank and pioneered its development during World War I, and produced the leading theorists of armored warfare, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, during the interwar years. Yet, the British were caught totally off-guard by the German blitzkriegs into Poland in 1939 and into France in 1940, and it took the British years to regain their superiority in armored warfare. This book insightfully and authoritatively chronicles the development of the tank and the theory of armored warfare during this crucial era. The greatest contribution of Professor Larson's study is the refutation of the persistent and erroneous myths given to explain the failure of Great Britain's armored forces at the beginning of the Second World War. In the past, this failure has been attributed to the dominance of the officer corps by the "landed classes, " who had "entered the army seeking a leisurely outdoor style of life compatible with their upbringing." Because of their upbringing, this stereotype continues, these officers favored the cavalry, and staunchly opposed every effort aimed at a diminution in the use and influence of the cavalry. These provincial traditionalists purportedly also sought to protect their revered regiments, many of which would have had to be abolished by the threatened expansion of the Royal Armored Corps. The author adroitly presents statistical proof that this "social interpretation" is "very largely nonsense, " since in 1930 the aristocracy and landed gentry constituted only eleven percent of the entire officer corps and forty percent of those holding the rank of major-general or above (p. 17). In addition, by an analysis of the promotion patterns of officers of the three combat arms (Infantry, cavalry, artillery) into the general officer ranks during the interwar period, the author shows that the cavalry was being steadily relegated to "a position of insignificance, if not total exclusion." The author also ably dissects the argument that British government policy and draconian economic measures were the cause of the initial British armor setbacks in World War II, and concludes these pretexts have "severe limitations." This argument does not explain, after the government realized it must prepare for a Continental commitment, why the ratio of armor to Infantry decreased-when it should have logically been increased. Nor does British policy explain the inability of its armored forces to successfully deploy against the Germans until the third year of the war. From these analyses, the author keenly deduces that the British armored forces were improperly trained for the type of combat which confronted them in World War II, primarily because "the British Army refused to change its basic strategic doctrines to maximize the potential of a new weapon of war." The remainder of the book supports this thesis. Derived from a review found on-line by Professor Harold Raugh, Jr. of UCLA from the UCLA Historical Journal, Volume 8.
