How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In "Lawlessness and Economics", Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms - such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and ...
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How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In "Lawlessness and Economics", Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms - such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services - have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems.
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Add this copy of Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of to cart. $20.00, very good condition, Sold by Robert Harper Books rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Hyattsville, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2004 by Princeton University Press.
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Seller's Description:
Very Good in Good jacket. Size: 8x5x1; The pages are clean and unmarked with some scuffs to the corners of the pages. The cover has some minor bumping and rubbing to the corners and edges. The dust jacket has some mild bumping and the front flap has creasing.
Add this copy of Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of to cart. $40.00, very good condition, Sold by Grendel Books, ABAA/ILAB rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Springfield, MA, UNITED STATES, published 2004 by Princeton University Press.
Add this copy of Lawlessness and Economics – Alternative Modes of to cart. $50.10, good condition, Sold by Anybook rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Lincoln, UNITED KINGDOM, published 2004 by Princeton University Press.
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This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside. This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item, 500grams, ISBN: 0691114862.
