This book examines how Russia and Kazakhstan navigated the dilemmas associated with building regulatory state institutions on the ruins of the Soviet command and control system. The two nations developed predatory and wasteful crony capitalism but still improved their business climates and economic performance. To better understand these seemingly incompatible outcomes, the book advances a theory of authoritarian regulatory statehood. It argues that politicians use institutions of the state as a means to balance conflicting ...
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This book examines how Russia and Kazakhstan navigated the dilemmas associated with building regulatory state institutions on the ruins of the Soviet command and control system. The two nations developed predatory and wasteful crony capitalism but still improved their business climates and economic performance. To better understand these seemingly incompatible outcomes, the book advances a theory of authoritarian regulatory statehood. It argues that politicians use institutions of the state as a means to balance conflicting elite demands for economic rents and popular demands for public goods and economic growth. An effective balancing of the two prevents elite subversion and popular revolt in the short run and ensures elites' continued access to economic rents in the long run. Empirical analysis of nearly a million national and regional regulatory documents enacted in Russia and Kazakhstan between 1990 and 2020 shows that formal regulatory institutions the autocrats built have a profound effect on economic outcomes. Moreover, at times of political vulnerability, autocracies use formal regulatory mechanisms to discipline state agencies responsible for policy implementation. By reducing capricious policy implementation by the regulatory bureaucracy, autocrats are able to reinvigorate economic performance and rebalance elite and popular interests. The theoretical argument advanced in the book links the use of institutional instruments of policy implementation to the political survival strategy. This study effectively shows that regulatory state building has emerged as an effective tool for strengthening autocratic regimes and enhancing their long-term survival.
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Add this copy of Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building to cart. $19.35, like new condition, Sold by Books From California rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Simi Valley, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Oxford University Press.
Add this copy of Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building to cart. $19.35, very good condition, Sold by Books From California rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Simi Valley, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Oxford University Press.
Add this copy of Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building to cart. $23.53, like new condition, Sold by GreatBookPrices rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Columbia, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Oxford University Press.
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Fine. Trade paperback (US). Glued binding. 336 p. Contains: Illustrations. In Stock. 100% Money Back Guarantee. Brand New, Perfect Condition, allow 4-14 business days for standard shipping. To Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. protectorate, P.O. box, and APO/FPO addresses allow 4-28 business days for Standard shipping. No expedited shipping. All orders placed with expedited shipping will be cancelled. Over 3, 000, 000 happy customers.
Add this copy of Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building to cart. $23.99, new condition, Sold by GreatBookPrices rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Columbia, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Oxford University Press.
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Seller's Description:
New. Trade paperback (US). Glued binding. 336 p. Contains: Illustrations. In Stock. 100% Money Back Guarantee. Brand New, Perfect Condition, allow 4-14 business days for standard shipping. To Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. protectorate, P.O. box, and APO/FPO addresses allow 4-28 business days for Standard shipping. No expedited shipping. All orders placed with expedited shipping will be cancelled. Over 3, 000, 000 happy customers.
Add this copy of Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats Format: Hardback to cart. $24.00, new condition, Sold by indoo rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Avenel, NJ, UNITED STATES, published 2023 by Oxford University Press.
Add this copy of Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats: Building to cart. $29.34, new condition, Sold by Ingram Customer Returns Center rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from NV, USA, published 2023 by Oxford University Press.
