This Council Speical Report concludes that if Congress does not approve the U.S.-India nuclear deal, " it would have a real and negative effect on the bilateral relationship." Congress should adopt a two-stage approach, formally endorsing the deal's basic framework, while delaying final approval until it is assured that critical nonproliferation needs are met. " Patience and a few simple fixes would address major proliferation concerns while ultimately strengthening the strategic partnership, " says the report.
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This Council Speical Report concludes that if Congress does not approve the U.S.-India nuclear deal, " it would have a real and negative effect on the bilateral relationship." Congress should adopt a two-stage approach, formally endorsing the deal's basic framework, while delaying final approval until it is assured that critical nonproliferation needs are met. " Patience and a few simple fixes would address major proliferation concerns while ultimately strengthening the strategic partnership, " says the report.
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Add this copy of U.S. -India Nuclear Cooperation; a Strategy for Moving to cart. $45.00, very good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2006 by Council on Foreign Relations.
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Very good. vii, [1], 28 pages. Footnotes. List of other Council Special Reports at back. Cover has slight wear and soiling. This Council Special Report concludes that if Congress does not approve the U.S. -India nuclear deal, " it would have a real and negative effect on the bilateral relationship." Congress should adopt a two-stage approach, formally endorsing the deal's basic framework, while delaying final approval until it is assured that critical nonproliferation needs are met. " Patience and a few simple fixes would address major proliferation concerns while ultimately strengthening the strategic partnership, " says the report. The authors, Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson, both Council fellows for science and technology, argue that " the Bush administration has stirred deep passions and put Congress in the seemingly impossible bind of choosing between approving the deal and damaging nuclear nonproliferation or rejecting the deal and thus setting back an important strategic relationship." But this is a false choice, they argue. Levi and Ferguson advise Congress to " reserve the bulk of its political capital for a handful of top-tier objectives. It should focus on preventing Indian nuclear testing, and fundamental changes in Indian nuclear strategy, rather than on blocking simple growth in the Indian nuclear stockpile. It should prioritize obtaining cooperation not only from India controlling the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, over measures that would shape the development on nuclear technology in India itself." The recent nuclear deal concluded between the Bush administration and the government of India has highlighted tensions between two widely held American foreign policy objectives: strengthening bilateral relationships with major powers and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The agreement, which proposes to change decades-old policy, has stirred considerable controversy, particularly in Congress, which must amend long-standing law if the deal is to go through. In hearings during the past two months, members of Congress from both parties have expressed a desire to find a strategy that contributes to an improved relationship with India without sacrificing American nonproliferation interests. In this Council Special Report, Council Fellows Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson propose such a strategy. Rather than focusing on only one dimension of the challenge, they explain the implications of the nuclear deal for both U.S. policy toward India and U.S. nonproliferation policy. This leads them to propose a focused set of nonproliferation bottom lines that Congress should enforce through its legislation, while also prompting them to counsel against more extreme nuclear-related measures that would certainly scuttle the U.S. -India accord and set back prospects of improvement in an increasingly important bilateral relationship. They also argue that Congress should hold hearings to promote a broad reassessment of American nonproliferation strategy. The result is a thoughtful product that merits careful consideration by members of Congress, the administration, and other interested parties in both the United States and India.
