Cyril Demaria specializes in private equity and combines practical and entrepreneurial experience, academic knowledge, and lecturing experience. Prior to founding and managing Pilot Fish, a series of private equity funds, he was Chief Investment Officer of Tiar??? Investment Management AG (Zurich). He previously created a multi-strategy fund of funds focused on environment (Pionat Viable Investments). Prior to that, he was an Investment Associate in a Swiss private equity fund of funds; a Portfolio Manager responsible for ...
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Cyril Demaria specializes in private equity and combines practical and entrepreneurial experience, academic knowledge, and lecturing experience. Prior to founding and managing Pilot Fish, a series of private equity funds, he was Chief Investment Officer of Tiar??? Investment Management AG (Zurich). He previously created a multi-strategy fund of funds focused on environment (Pionat Viable Investments). Prior to that, he was an Investment Associate in a Swiss private equity fund of funds; a Portfolio Manager responsible for private equity funds investments for a French insurance group; and Head of Corporate Development of a French IT firm in charge of acquisitions and financing. He started his career in an American hybrid venture capital and fund of funds firm. A French citizen, Cyril holds a BA in Political Sciences from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Lyon), a Masters in Geopolitics applied to Money and Finance (Paris); a Masters in European Business Law (Paris); and is a graduate from HEC (Paris, specialized in Entrepreneurship). He is a doctoral candidate at University Sankt-Gallen and an Associate Professor at EDHEC (Nice, Lille, London), ESCP-Europe (London), ESCE (Paris), EADA (Barcelona), Fipecafi (Sao Paulo), USP (Sao Paulo) and IFP Business School (Paris). He lectures on "Private Equity", "LBO", "Money and Finance", and "International Finance". He notably holds executive training sessions at the Association Fran???aisedes Investisseurs en Capital (Paris) and the Soci???t??? Fran???aise des Analystes Financiers (Paris). Cyril collaborates regularly as an expert with the SECA, AFIC, and EVCA.
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Add this copy of Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear to cart. $24.81, good condition, Sold by BookResQ. rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from West Valley, UT, UNITED STATES, published 1984 by Brookings Institution Press.
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Good. Size: 102x19x148; Ex-library book with typical stickers and stampings. RF tag removed from the back of the book which took some paper with it. Priority Mail is available on this item. No international shipping.
Add this copy of Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear to cart. $25.18, good condition, Sold by ThriftBooks-Baltimore rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Halethorpe, MD, UNITED STATES, published 1984 by Brookings Institution Press.
Add this copy of Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear to cart. $32.50, very good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 1985 by The Brookings Institution.
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Very good. xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board, a small group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research, work and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. There are several definitions of command and control (C2). According to older versions of U.S. Army FM 3-0, C2 in a military organization is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The term may also refer to command and control systems within a military system. Strategic Command and Control applies to nuclear weapons. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence.
