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Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians

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Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians - Parker, Glenn R
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Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on economic literature on the behavior of firms, Glenn Parker answers no. He argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. He draws ...

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Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians 2004, Princeton University Press, Princeton

ISBN-13: 9780691117393

Hardcover