Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public ...
Read More
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications.; The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Read Less
Add this copy of Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships to cart. $69.32, good condition, Sold by Dream Books Co. rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Denver, CO, UNITED STATES, published 2006 by Oxford University Press.
Choose your shipping method in Checkout. Costs may vary based on destination.
Seller's Description:
Good. Minimal signs of wear. Corners and cover may show wear. May contain highlighting and or writing. May be missing dust jacket. May not include supplemental materials. May be a former library book.
Add this copy of Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships to cart. $101.49, good condition, Sold by Book Words rated 3.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Midland Park, NJ, UNITED STATES, published 2006 by Oxford University Press.
Add this copy of Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships to cart. $129.50, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2006 by Oxford University Press.
Add this copy of Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships to cart. $130.62, new condition, Sold by GridFreed rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from North Las Vegas, NV, UNITED STATES, published 2006 by Oxford University Press.
Add this copy of Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships to cart. $155.35, good condition, Sold by TEXTSHUB rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Franklin Lakes, NJ, UNITED STATES, published 2006 by Oxford University Press.
Add this copy of Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships to cart. $178.94, new condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2006 by Oxford University Press.
