William E. Odom combines expertise in political science and military affairs to challenge both conventional and unconventional wisdom about insurgencies and political development. The author concludes that in all three components of U.S. strategy for counterinsurgency--political, economic, and military--faulty notions of causation inform policy. U.S. advice to embattled governments fails to recognize the inherent clash of development goals; direct fiscal aid hurts more often than it helps recipient governments; and the ...
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William E. Odom combines expertise in political science and military affairs to challenge both conventional and unconventional wisdom about insurgencies and political development. The author concludes that in all three components of U.S. strategy for counterinsurgency--political, economic, and military--faulty notions of causation inform policy. U.S. advice to embattled governments fails to recognize the inherent clash of development goals; direct fiscal aid hurts more often than it helps recipient governments; and the focus of U.S. military assistance on fighting insurgents plays to their strengths and fails to exploit their weaknesses. On Internal War reviews the contrasting theory and practice in Soviet and American approaches to their competition in the Third World and relates them to indigenous causes of internal wars. Odom also integrates the military dimensions of insurgencies with external influences and internal politics. Drawing on political development theory, he underscores the sources of instability in Third World states that make insurgencies more likely and offers ways to assess the prospects for democracy in specific cases. The centerpiece of the study is a practical application of the author's analysis to three case studies--El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines--and a regional assessment of the Middle East. Odom provides no panaceas but suggests that more promising strategies can be devised.
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Add this copy of On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to to cart. $21.95, very good condition, Sold by Daedalus Books rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Portland, OR, UNITED STATES, published 1992 by Duke University Press.
Add this copy of On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to to cart. $58.99, very good condition, Sold by Halcyon Books rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from LONDON, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM, published 1992 by Duke University Press.
Add this copy of On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to to cart. $98.76, new condition, Sold by GridFreed rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from North Las Vegas, NV, UNITED STATES, published 1991 by Duke University Press Books.
Add this copy of On Internal War; American and Soviet Approaches to to cart. $475.00, good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 1992 by Duke University Press.
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Seller's Description:
Good in Very good jacket. viii, 271, [1] pages. Publisher's ephemera on the book laid in. DJ has slight wear and soiling. Some ink underlining and comments, primarily but not exclusively in the Introduction. Illustrations. Inscribed by the author on the half-title page. Inscription reads To Jay Peterzeh, Best wishes as you struggle with the soporific prose! William E. Odom 1 Sep 92. Acknowledgments, Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, and Index. The Two-Camp Struggle: Competing Approaches; The Political and Economic Context for Internal War; The Indigenous Sources of Internal Wars; Where U.S. Involvement in Internal wars is Probable; The Record of East-West Competition in the Third World; Case Assessments: Test of Concepts; The El Salvadoran Case; The Guatemalan Case; The Philippines Case; The Middle East-Southwest Asian Challenge; and Case Assessments, Conclusion. William Eldridge Odom (June 23, 1932-May 30, 2008) was a United States Army lieutenant general who served as Director of the National Security Agency under President Ronald Reagan, which culminated a 31-year career in military intelligence, mainly specializing in matters relating to the Soviet Union. After his retirement from the military, he became a think tank policy expert and a university professor and became known for his outspoken criticism of the Iraq War and warrantless wiretapping of American citizens. Odom was a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, where he specialized in military issues, intelligence, and international relations. He earned a national reputation as an expert on the Soviet military. William E. Odom combines expertise in political science and military affairs to challenge both conventional and unconventional wisdom about insurgencies and political development. The author concludes that in all three components of U.S. strategy for counterinsurgency, political, economic, and military, faulty notions of causation inform policy. U.S. advice to embattled governments fails to recognize the inherent clash of development goals; direct fiscal aid hurts more often than it helps recipient governments; and the focus of U.S. military assistance on fighting insurgents plays to their strengths and fails to exploit their weaknesses. On Internal War reviews the contrasting theory and practice in Soviet and American approaches to their competition in the Third World and relates them to indigenous causes of internal wars. Odom also integrates the military dimensions of insurgencies with external influences and internal politics. Drawing on political development theory, he underscores the sources of instability in Third World states that make insurgencies more likely and offers ways to assess the prospects for democracy in specific cases. The centerpiece of the study is a practical application of the author's analysis to three case studies, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines, and a regional assessment of the Middle East. Odom provides no panaceas but suggests that more promising strategies can be devised.
Add this copy of On Internal War; American and Soviet Approaches to to cart. $500.00, very good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 1992 by Duke University Press.
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Seller's Description:
Very good in Good jacket. viii, 271, [1] pages. DJ has some wear and sticker residue. Inscribed by the author on the half title page. Inscription reads: To Jean Brounas, with fondest regards, Bill, Odom. Includes Acknowledgments, Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, and Index. Includes chapters on The Two-Camp Struggle: Competing Approaches; The Political and Economic Context for Internal War; The Indigenous Sources of Internal Wars; Where U.S. Involvement in Internal Wars is Probable; The Record of East-West Competition in the Third World; Case Assessments: Test of Concepts; The El Salvadoran Case; The Guatemalan Case; The Philippines Case; The Middle East-Southwest Asian Challenge; Case Assessments Conclusion; What Is to Be Done? William Eldridge Odom (June 23, 1932-May 30, 2008) was a United States Army lieutenant general who served as Director of the National Security Agency under President Ronald Reagan, which culminated a 31-year career in military intelligence, mainly specializing in matters relating to the Soviet Union. After his retirement from the military, he became a think tank policy expert and a university professor and became known for his outspoken criticism of the Iraq War and warrantless wiretapping of American citizens. William E. Odom combines expertise in political science and military affairs to challenge both conventional and unconventional wisdom about insurgencies and political development. The author concludes that in all three components of U.S. strategy for counterinsurgency--political, economic, and military--faulty notions of causation inform policy. This book reviews the contrasting theory and practice in the Soviet and American approaches to their competition in the Third World, and relates them to indigenous causes of internal wars. It also integrates the military dimensions of insurgencies with external influences and internal policies. Drawing on political development theory, Odom underscores the sources of instability in Third World states that make insurgencies more likely, and suggests ways to assess the prospects for democracy in specific cases. The centerpiece of the study is a practical application of his analysis to three case studies--El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines--and a regional assessment of the Middle East. Odom offers no panaceas, but he suggests that more promising strategies can be devised. Land reform is imperative to undercut peasant insurgencies. This book is unique in mixing political theory and policy practice in a major area of American foreign policy. It will be of keen interest to political scientists and policymakers alike.
