"In 2009, President Obama spotlighted nuclear terrorism as one of the top threats to international security, launching an international effort to identify, secure, and dispose of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials -- namely highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. Since that time, three nuclear security summits have been held, along with scores of studies and workshops (official and unofficial), drawing sustained high-level attention to the threat posed by these materials. However, little ...
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"In 2009, President Obama spotlighted nuclear terrorism as one of the top threats to international security, launching an international effort to identify, secure, and dispose of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials -- namely highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. Since that time, three nuclear security summits have been held, along with scores of studies and workshops (official and unofficial), drawing sustained high-level attention to the threat posed by these materials. However, little attention has been given to incidences where sensitive nuclear materials actually went missing. This volume seeks to correct this deficiency, examining incidences of material unaccounted for (MUF) arising from the U.S. and South African nuclear weapons programs, plutonium gone missing from Japanese and British civilian production facilities, and a theft of highly enriched uranium from a U.S. military contractor in the 1960s that was used to help fuel Israel's nuclear weapons program. This volume also questions the likelihood that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be able to detect diversions of fissile materials, whether large or small, and the likelihood that a state could or would do anything about the diversion if it was detected. What emerges from this book is an assessment of how likely we are to be able to account for past MUF quantities or to be able to prevent future ones"--Publisher's web site.
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Add this copy of Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does to cart. $7.99, good condition, Sold by Wonder Book - Member ABAA/ILAB rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Frederick, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2015 by Department of the Army.
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Good. Good condition. A copy that has been read but remains intact. May contain markings such as bookplates, stamps, limited notes and highlighting, or a few light stains.
Add this copy of Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does to cart. $8.00, very good condition, Sold by Pomfret Street Books rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Carlisle, PA, UNITED STATES, published 2015 by Department of the Army.
Add this copy of Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does to cart. $35.74, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2015 by Department of the Army.
Add this copy of Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does to cart. $75.00, very good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2014 by U.S. Army War College.
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Very good. ix, [1], 191, [3] pages. Wraps, chapter endnotes, tables, appendix. Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars and the media. He teaches as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and The Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. From 1989 to 1993, Sokolski served as the Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for which he received the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public Service. Prior to this, he worked in the Secretary's of Defense's Office of Net Assessment on strategic weapons proliferation issues. In addition to his Executive Branch service, Sokolski worked on the Hill from 1984 through 1988 as senior military legislative aide to Senate Armed Services Committee member Dan Quayle, and from 1982 through 1983 as special assistant Senator Gordon J. Humphrey. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and IISS and is on the editorial board of The Nonproliferation Review. In 2004, The National Journal recognized Sokolski as one of the ten key individuals whose ideas will help shape the policy debate on the future of nuclear weapons. This book examines incidences of nuclear material unaccounted for arising from U.S. and South African nuclear weapons programs, plutonium gone missing from Japanese and British civilian production facilities, and a theft of highly enriched uranium from a U.S. military contractor in the 1960's that was used to help fuel Israel's nuclear weapons program. The book also questions the likelihood that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be able to detect diversions of fissile materials, whether large or small, and the likelihood that a state could or would do anything were diversion detected.
Add this copy of Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does to cart. $75.00, good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2014 by U.S. Army War College Press.
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Seller's Description:
Good. ix, [1], 191, [3] pages. Figure. Table. Endnotes. Cover has some wear and corner curling. Henry D. Sokolski is the founder and executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington, D.C. -based think tank promoting a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues among policymakers, scholars, and the media. From 1989 to 1993, Sokolski served as the Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for which he received the U.S. Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public Service. Prior to this, he worked in the Secretary of Defense's Office of Net Assessment on strategic weapons proliferation issues. Sokolski worked in Congress from 1984 through 1988 as senior military legislative aide to U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee member Dan Quayle and from 1982 through 1983 as special assistant on nuclear energy matters to Senator Gordon J. Humphrey. He worked as a consultant on nuclear weapons proliferation to the intelligence community's National Intelligence Council, received a Congressional appointment to the Deutch Proliferation Commission, served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's senior advisory panel from 1995 to 1996, and was a member of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and IISS and is on the editorial board of The Nonproliferation Review. The National Journal recognized Sokolski as one of the ten key individuals whose ideas will help shape the policy debate on the future of nuclear weapons. In 2009, President Obama spotlighted nuclear territories as one of the top threats to international security, launching an international effort to identify, secure, and dispose of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials namely highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. Since that time, three nuclear security summits have been held, along with scores of studies and workshops (official and unofficial), drawing sustained high-level attention to the threat posed by these materials. However, little attention has been given to incidences where sensitive nuclear materials actually went missing. This volume seeks to correct this deficiency, examining incidences of material unaccounted (MUF) for arising from the U.S. and South African nuclear weapons programs, plutonium gone missing from Japanese and British civilian production facilities, and a theft of highly enriched uranium from a U.S. military contractor in the 1960s that was used to help fuel Israel's nuclear weapons program. This volume also questions the likelihood that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be able to detect diversions of fissile materials, whether large or small, and the likelihood that a state could or would do anything were diversion detected. What emerges from this book is an assessment of how likely we are able to account for past MUF quantities or to be able to prevent future ones. U.S. policymakers, military analysts, and international diplomats may be interested in the findings within this document that references the absence of fissile materials and the sensitivities that surround the countries with missing materials.
