The U.S. President and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, one would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the promotion of nuclear power's growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they ...
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The U.S. President and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, one would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the promotion of nuclear power's growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation are manageable either by making future nuclear plants more "proliferation-resistant" or by strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and acquiring more timely intelligence on proliferators. How sound is this view? How useful might civilian nuclear programs be for states that want to get nuclear weapons quickly? Are current International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards sufficient to block military nuclear diversions from civilian programs? Are there easy fixes to upgrade these controls? How much can we count on more timely intelligence on proliferators to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons? This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 top security and nuclear experts to get the answers. What emerges is a comprehensive counternarrative to the prevailing wisdom and a series of innovative reforms to tighten existing nuclear nonproliferation controls. For any official, analyst, or party concerned about the spread of nuclear technology, this book is essential reading.
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Good. Glued binding. xii, 507, [1] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Endnotes. Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He was appointed by the U.S. Congress to serve on the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and terrorism, which filed its final report in December 2008. Sokolski served from 1989 to 1993 as the Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and later received the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public Service. Prior to this, he worked in the Secretary's Office of Net Assessment on proliferation issues. Sokolski served as Senior Military Legislative Aide to Senator Dan Quayle, and as Special Assistant on Nuclear Energy Matters to Senator Gordon J. Humphrey. Sokolski also served as a consultant on proliferation issues to the intelligence community's National Intelligence Council and served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Advisory Panel. He also worked as a consultant on nuclear weapons proliferation issues to the Intelligence Community's National Intelligence Council; received a Congressional appointment to the Deutch Proliferation Commission, which completed its report in July 1999; served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Advisory Panel from 1995 to 1996; and was a member of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, which operated until 2010. The U.S. President and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, one would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the promotion of nuclear power's growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation are manageable either by making future nuclear plants more "proliferation-resistant" or by strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and acquiring more timely intelligence on proliferators. How sound is this view? How useful might civilian nuclear programs be for states that want to get nuclear weapons quickly? Are current International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards sufficient to block military nuclear diversions from civilian programs? Are there easy fixes to upgrade these controls? How much can we count on more timely intelligence on proliferators to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons? This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 top security and nuclear experts to get the answers. What emerges is a comprehensive counternarrative to the prevailing wisdom and a series of innovative reforms to tighten existing nuclear nonproliferation controls. This book may appeal to any official, policymaker, analyst, or party concerned about the spread of nuclear technology; --this book is essential reading. Students writing papers on nuclear weapons may find this resource helpful in their research.