"Lee is Trapped, and Must be Taken": Eleven Fateful Days After Gettysburg: July 4 to July 14, 1863

The Eleven Days After Gettysburg

Following defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia determined on a retreat. Retreats are always hazardous, and the retreat from Gettysburg was particularly so. Lee's army was far from its base and had to travel over 40 miles to reach the Potomac River and cross over into Virginia. Lee was handicapped by his long trains, the condition of his army, and by foul weather. The Potomac River had swollen and Lee was unable to cross. He faced an attack from the Union Army with his back to the river. With all the difficulties, Lee managed to cross to the south bank of the Potomac on July 14, 1863, bringing his army to safety.

From the conclusion of the retreat to the present, there has been controversy about the retreat. Broadly, the issue is whether the Union Army of the Potomac and its commanding general, George Meade, were as aggressive as they should have been in cutting Lee off and forcing him to fight north of the Potomac. President Lincoln, for one, was notably displeased because he thought that Meade had allowed Lee's army to escape.

A great deal has been written about Gettysburg and there is much to learn. In broad accounts of the battle, the retreat usually only gets a brief treatment at the end of the book Fortunately, in recent years, the Gettysburg retreat has received considerable attention, and there are at least three excellent b00k-length studies each of which offers its own perspective on the battle and on the retreat.

In 2005, Kent Masterson wrote "Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign". This study focused on the Southern war aims in invading Pennsylvania and found that these aims were in part realized even with the defeat at Gettysburg. Masterson offered a careful analysis of the retreat and of the factors which inhibited the Union pursuit and the options available to Meade to cut the Confederate army off.

In 2008, Eric Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michale F. Nugent wrote "One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4 -- 14, 1863". The authors wrote to dispel the myth that Lee's retreat was uncontested by emphasizing the extent of the fighting during Meade's pursuit. The authors have a particular interest in cavalry and emphasized the role of the competing troopers, North and South. The book described the military action on the retreat in commendable detail.

The third new book on the retreat is the work under review, "Lee is Trapped and Must be Taken" Eleven Faithful Days after Gettysburg, July 4-- 14, 1863" by Thomas Ryan and Richard Schaus. Both authors have long experience in military intelligence and Ryan has written an award-winning book, "Spies, Secrets, and Scouts in the Gettysburg Campaign" as a predecessor to this volume. Their new book focuses on the gathering and use of intelligence by the two armies during the Gettysburg retreat and pursuit. In particular, the book discusses the intelligence gathered by the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information (BMI) during the retreat and the use or misuse the Union army made of it.

The book evidences a great deal of research, some of which has not been used before in any study, and offers a good detailed study of the retreat. The book is organized on a day-by-day basis which allows the reader to follow the frequently confusing events. The work begins with an excellent short opening chapter on the Battle of Gettysburg itself and concludes with materials showing responses in the retreat's immediate aftermath and with a chapter showing how other scholars have viewed the retreat. In addition to discussing intelligence gathering and use, the book discusses the political context of the retreat as President Lincoln and General in Chief Halleck followed the unfolding events with dismay. Lincoln was chagrined throughout with Meade's pursuit and with Lee's escape. Ryan and Schaus also bring in materials sometimes overlooked in studying the retreat. They study the fate of the many Union prisoners and they also return back to Gettysburg to consider the treatment of the wounded in the aftermath of the battle. The book includes good maps for each day of the retreat which help in the understanding of the text.

There is a great deal to like in this book for readers interested in Gettysburg and in military intelligence. Although I learned a great deal, I found much of this study unconvincing. The thrust of the book is that General Meade was too slow, unimaginative, and lackadaisical in his pursuit, thus allowing Lee to escape. The authors give Meade credit for his success as a defensive commander at Gettysburg, after only three days in charge of the Army of the Potomac. But they find that Meade did not understand the purpose of the retreat -- to cut off and cripple the enemy army rather than simply forcing it from Northern soil. The authors find Meade at virtually every turn overly cautious. In places, they recognize the difficulty of a frontal attack on the Confederate positions. But they offer alternatives to a frontal attack that they find were known and available to Meade and not pursued.

This type of criticism of Meade is not new, of course, but it has not been an uncontested view. I wasn't convinced, and the use of BMI reports didn't make me think differently. Broadly, Meade had to look to the condition of his own exhausted army and the need to resupply it from a distant base. His army had been through a great deal, and the rainy weather hampered his pursuit at Gettysburg at least as much as it hampered Lee. Meade's pursuit options were limited because he was under orders to protect Washington, D.C as well as to attack and cut off Lee. The decision to delay in attacking the Confederate's strongly fortified position at Williamsport was probably correct, even on the authors' account given the strength of the Confederate position. It isn't clear that the alternatives the book suggests would have fared better.

There are some broader factors in evaluating Meade's actions that the book doesn't consider adequately. Pursuits of defeated armies in the Civil War, such as at Antietam, Manassas, Chickamauga, Shiloh, and other battles rarely were able to inflict substantial additional damage. Meade's pursuit was more aggressive than the pursuits following other major battles. In addition, the Civil War before, during and after Gettysburg is replete with instances showing the hazards of a frontal attack on an entrenched position. Meade made, in the view of many, a reasonable and probably correct choice in not attacking at Williamsport. The two earlier books on the retreat both take a far more measured and cautious approach to Meade's leadership than does this book. The authors of "One Continuous Fight" are cautiously critical of Meade in places but devote most of their criticism to the deployment of the Union cavalry. In sum, I think this book is overly harsh and polemical against General Meade at virtually every point in their book. A more balanced perspective would have been welcome and appropriate.

One of the values of reading history is to understand and consider multiple accounts of the same events. It is important to learn perspective, whether the subject is military, political, or social history. Thus, I found it valuable to read and learn from the three recent book length studies of the Gettysburg retreat, each of which has its own perspective and its own virtues. I was not convinced by Ryan's and Schaus' treatment of Meade, but I enjoyed thinking again about Gettysburg and the retreat. The publisher, Savas Beatie, kindly sent me a review copy of this book.

Robin Friedman