Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over 35 years. These two volumes provide convenient access to all of his major research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. When you look closely at one scientific idea, writes Aumann, you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I ...
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Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over 35 years. These two volumes provide convenient access to all of his major research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. When you look closely at one scientific idea, writes Aumann, you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study.
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Add this copy of Collected Papers: Volume II to cart. $50.00, like new condition, Sold by Grendel Books, ABAA/ILAB rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Springfield, MA, UNITED STATES, published 2000 by MIT Press.
Add this copy of Collected Papers, Vol. 2 to cart. $120.10, new condition, Sold by GridFreed rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from North Las Vegas, NV, UNITED STATES, published 2000 by The MIT Press.
Add this copy of Collected Papers: Volume II to cart. $122.00, very good condition, Sold by Expatriate Bookshop rated 1.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Svendborg, DENMARK, published 2000 by MIT Press.
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Seller's Description:
Minor rubbing. VG., dustwrapper. 26x18cm, xiii, 792 pp. Contains 41 papers. Includes: Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments; The Core of a Cooperative Game without Side Payments; Introduction to "Some Thought on the Theory of Cooperative Games"; A Survey of Cooperative Games without Side Payments; The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games; A Method of Computing the Kernal of n-Person Games; Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures; Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud; Markets with a Continuum of Traders; Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders; Disadvantageous Monopolies; A Note on Gale's Example; On the Rate of Convergence of the Core; Values of Markets wiuth a Continuum of Traders; Power & Taxes; Power & Taxes in a Multi-Commodity Economy; Core & Value for a Public Goods Economy: An Example; Power & Public Goods; Voting for Public Goods; Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices; Economic Applications of the Shapley Value; Endogenous Formation on Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value; An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value; Values for Games without Side Payments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts; In the Existence and Interpretation on Value Allocaiton; On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples; Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations; Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley's Value; Spaces of Measurable Transformation...
