This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.
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This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.
Read Less
Add this copy of Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: to cart. $53.98, very good condition, Sold by Wonder Book - Member ABAA/ILAB rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Frederick, MD, UNITED STATES, published 1992 by MIT Press (MA).
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Very Good. Very Good condition. Very Good dust jacket. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.
Add this copy of Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: to cart. $64.64, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 1992 by Mit Pr.
Add this copy of Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: to cart. $67.80, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2003 by MIT Press.
Add this copy of Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: to cart. $102.00, very good condition, Sold by Expatriate Bookshop rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Svendborg, DENMARK, published 1998 by MIT Press.
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Minor rubbing. VG., dustwrapper. 23x15cm, xix, 496 pp. Contents: Motives for Monetary Expansion under Perfect Information; The Employment Motive for Monetary Expansion; The Revenue Motive for Monetary Expansion; The Mercantilistic or Balance-of-Payments Motive for Monetary Expansion; Comparison of Policy Outcomes under a System of Adjustable Pegs with Outcomes under a Commonly Managed Currency System & Its Consequences for European Monetary Unification; The Financial Stability Motive, Interest Rate Smoothing, & the Theory of Optimal Seigniorage; Asymmetic Information & Changing Objectives under Discretion; Overview of Models of Monetary Policy with Private Information; The Employment Motive in the Presence of a Minimal Information Advantage about Objectives; An Extended Information Advantage about Central Bank Objectives; Alternative Notions of Credibility & Reputation; The Politically Optimal Level of Ambiguity; Velocity Shocks, Politics, Signalling, Inflation Persistence, & Accomodation: Private Information About Money Demand & Credibility; Partial Disclosure of Policy & Its Effect on Policy Outcomes; Why Does Inflation Persist? Theories of Monetary Accomodation & of Inflation Cyclixality under Discretion; Signaling & Private Information about the Ability to Commit & about Objectives with Time-Invariant Types; Political Parties & Monetary Policy; Central Bank Independence & Policy Outcomes: Theory & Evidence: Aspects of Central Bank Independence & their Impact on Policy Outcomes & the Distribution of Inflation; The Measurement of Central Bank Independence...
Add this copy of Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: to cart. $103.28, new condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2003 by MIT Press.