Ascending To The Absolute With Findlay
After graduating from college, I was admitted to the graduate philosophy program at Yale. At the time, Yale was known for its program of metaphysical, speculative philosophy that ran counter to the analytical philosophy mostly practiced in the United States. Among the philosophers at Yale that attracted me was J.N. Findlay (1903 -- 1987), born in South Africa and educated at Oxford. Findlay taught at Yale when I applied and subsequently taught at Boston University. My career path and life took a different direction. I didn't attend Yale but ultimately went to law school instead. I maintained my interest in philosophy and in the type of philosophy practiced by Findlay which was out of fashion at the time and remains so today. After retiring from the law, my reading in philosophy intensified, with an emphasis on American philosophy and on pragmatic idealism of the type associated with Josiah Royce. After a long time, I returned to read something of Findlay's.
Findlay's book "Ascent to the Absolute" was published in 1970, during the years he taught at Yale. The book has been on my shelves for years, and I read it without much understanding ages ago before deciding to return to it. The book consists of 15 essays and lectures concerned with what Findlay describes in his Preface as "the nature of metaphysics in general or with the more special topic of 'Absolute-theory'". By 'Absolute-theory', Findlay means "the theory of an intrinsically necessary all-explanatory existent. " Philosophical appeals to the Absolute have been markedly suspect in the United States since the work of Royce. Findlay references the early 20th century absolute idealist philosophers in Britain and the United States and criticizes their work as tepid and as not fully capturing the nature and scope of philosophical absolutism.
Findlay writes in a highly ornate, expansive, and polemical style which often is effective and a delight to read but which is frequently difficult and question-begging. While rejecting the analytical and language philosophy he learned as a student at Oxford, Findlay was deeply influenced by its approach. In particular, he shows a great interest in logic, albeit a different kind of logic from that of Russell and of the early Wittgenstein. Among his predecessors, Royce too had a strong interest in logic and worked to develop a relational logic not wedded to individualism and atomism. Findlay's influences include Plato and the neo-Platonism of Plotinus and Proclus, the phenomenology of Husserl, and the philosophy of Hegel. He has insightful things to say about each of these philosophers, and he combines them into his own thought. Although an absolutist in philosophy, Findlay is not an idealist who holds that reality is throughout mental or spiritual. As I understand him, Findlay holds that the Absolute is a combination of the transcendent and the ideal with the day to day world of nature. He finds the former in part reflected in the latter. It is the nature of the Absolute to be what Findlay calls dirempted -- sundered and split The dirempted, split world attempts to return to unity in the Absolute but part of the character of the Absolute is to be split and working towards unity. In many respects, Findlay's Absolute is more a process than a thing. Findlay's thought seems to me to have affinities with Whitehead's.
The 15 essays in this book have varied degrees of accessibility and technicality. The clearest and most complete expositions of Findlay's position are found in his concluding essay "Towards a Neo-neo-Platonism" and in the opening set of lectures, "Three Lectures on Absolute-Theory", which consists of lectures Findlay gave in 1968 at Wesleyan University, Connecticut. In these lectures, Findlay tries, with mixed success, to set out what it means to be a philosophical Absolute, to show how the Absolute can play a crucial role in resolving traditional problems of philosophy, and to show the Absolute's significance for a transcendental, spiritual understanding of philosophy and the human condition, or what Findlay calls "Rational Eschatology" Findlay is ultimately a philosopher of what he terms "Rational Mysticism" which aims, as stated earlier, to restate and amplify the works of Plotinus, Hegel, Eckhart, and the mystical tradition of the East and West. Findlay discusses and develops his rational mysticism in the essay "The Logic of Mysticism" in this volume.
In addition to the opening and concluding essays and "The Logic of Mysticism", I found particularly valuable and approachable Findlay's essay "Hegel's Use of Teleology". At the time Findlay wrote, Hegel was also little appreciated in American and British philosophy. It seems to me this situation is changing somewhat with large, thoughtful studies of Hegel by thinkers including Robert Brandom, Terry Pinkard, Robert Pippin, and others. Findlay's work may be important in light of the recent increase of interest in Hegel. Findlay works to defuse the picture of Hegel as an other-worldly absolute idealist. Findlay writes:
"Finite existence in the here and the now, with every limitation of quality and circumstance, is, Hegel teaches, when rightly regarded and accepted, identical with the infinite existence which is everywhere and always. To live in Main Street is, if one lives in the right spirit, to inhabit the Holy City, a view that will be deeply surprising and shocking to many of Hegel's transcendental interpreters."
I was moved to read Findlay again after a long time and, perhaps, with greater understanding. The book was of particular significance in reminding me of the road not taken. In thinking about Findlay, I learned from a site available on media titled "John Niemeyer Findlay: A Tribute" maintained by a scholar and former dissertation student of Findlay's. Reading Findlay reminded me of the many paths available in philosophy and of my lifelong fascination with philosophical thinking and the philosophical life.
Robin Friedman
