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Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations

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Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations - Feaver, Peter D
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How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state.

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Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations 2005, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

ISBN-13: 9780674017610

Revised edition

Trade paperback

Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations 2003, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

ISBN-13: 9780674010512

Hardcover