Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
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Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
Read Less
Add this copy of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation to cart. $74.69, fair condition, Sold by Anybook rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Lincoln, UNITED KINGDOM, published 1993 by MIT Press.
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Seller's Description:
This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside. This book has hardback covers. Clean from markings. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item, 1850grams, ISBN: 9780262121743.
Add this copy of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation to cart. $161.10, new condition, Sold by GridFreed rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from North Las Vegas, NV, UNITED STATES, published 1993 by The MIT Press.
