Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
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Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
Read Less
Add this copy of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation to cart. $74.37, good condition, Sold by Big River Books rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Powder Springs, GA, UNITED STATES, published 1993 by Mit Pr.
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This book is in good condition. The cover has minor creases or bends. The binding is tight and pages are intact. Some pages may have writing or highlighting.
Add this copy of A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation to cart. $124.20, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 1993 by Mit Pr.
