Add this copy of A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, to cart. $71.76, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2010 by Cambridge University Press.
Add this copy of A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, to cart. $42.88, new condition, Sold by Ingram Customer Returns Center rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from NV, USA, published 2002 by Cambridge University Press.
Add this copy of A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, to cart. $107.90, new condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2002 by Cambridge University Press.
Add this copy of A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, to cart. $114.00, good condition, Sold by Expatriate Bookshop rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Svendborg, DENMARK, published 1996 by Cambridge University Press.
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Seller's Description:
Minor rubbing. Small stain to rear cover. VG. 24x16cm, xiii, 343 pp. Contents: The making of an alliance; The issue of postwar Japan; China's lost territories; Korea's independence; The road to Cairo; A divisive summit; Yan'an and postwar East Asia; Diplomacy without action; Erosion of a partnership; The Manchurian triangle; Bargaining at Moscow; Epilogue: the crisis of peace Appendices. [" A Partnership for Disorder examines American-Chinese foreign policy planning in World War II for decolonising the Japanese Empire and controlling Japan after the war. This study unravels some of the complex origins of the postwar upheavals in Asia by demonstrating how the US and China's disagreements on many concrete issues prevented their governments from forging an effective partnership. The two powers' quest for long-term cooperation was further complicated by Moscow' s eleventh-hour involvement in the Pacific War. By the war's end, a triangular relationship among Washington, Moscow, and Chongqing surfaced from secret negotiations at Yalta and Moscow. Yet the Yalta-Moscow system in Asia proved too ambiguous and fragile to be useful even for the purpose of defining a new balance of power among the Allies. The failure of the system was compounded by its obliviousness to Asia's dynamic nationalist forces"-Publisher's description].
